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Amidst allegations of assault against a Guardian reporter just days before the election, it was
speculated that Republican candidate for Montana’s sole House of Representative seat, Greg
Gianforte, would suffer at the ballot box. However, though the nature of Montana’s early voting
system led some to argue Gianforte would only experience a smaller backlash from voters (given
that many votes had already been cast), Mara Suttmann-Lea argues that the nature of partisanship
and voting behavior in Montana means that even without early voting, Gianforte may well have won
regardless of his assault charges.
The May 25th, 2017 special election for Montana’s sole U.S. House of Representatives seat took an unexpected turn
on the eve of the election when Republican candidate Greg Gianforte was charged with assault for body slamming a
reporter. The race between Gianforte and Democrat Rob Quist had been tightening in recent weeks, and Democrats
surmised the turn of events might tip the scales in their favor on Election Day.
A problem for the Democrats, however, was that an estimated 7 in 10 Montanans had already voted; Montana
allows any resident to vote before Election Day by absentee ballot either by mail or in person. Gianforte’s assault
occurred late enough so that almost no Montanans voting early would have a chance to reassess their vote choices,
except for those who waited to mark absentee ballots after the assault and deliver them to an Elections office on
Election Day. Once the final results were tallied, political observers were quick to suggest early voting helped ensure
a win for Gianforte despite the shocking nature of the assault. Too many Montanans, they argued—unable to change
their vote choice—had cast ballots by the time of the assault for the event to change the outcome.
Political scandals like Gianforte’s attack have the potential to shift final vote margins up to about 10 percentage
points. But, as highlighted in analysis done by FiveThirtyEight, in the Montana special election this shift affected just
the third of the voting electorate that had yet to vote by Election Day. This meant that Quist’s overall margin could
only theoretically improve by around three percentage points. On the surface, then, it is plausible to argue that early
voting may have prevented the scandal from making a larger impact. Gianforte performed better in the early vote
than Quist, leaving him with too large of a deficit to make up on Election Day. Had most voters cast their ballots on
Election Day, Quist may have enjoyed a larger portion of the 10 percent scandal shift, as more of Giantforte’s voters
would have headed to the polling both with information about the assault, potentially enough to swing the outcome in
his favor.
However, there are important trends to consider that complicate our understanding of the impact of early voting on
the outcome of the Montana special election. First, early voters tend to be more strongly partisan, making it unlikely
that, if those same partisans voted on Election Day instead of early, enough would have been swayed to change the
outcome unless the race was extremely close. There is little reason to believe that enough early voters would have
changed their minds had they voted on Election Day to change the outcome. My research suggests that, alongside
being more likely to make a candidate choice and stick with it early on in a campaign season, strong partisans make
up such a large portion of the early voting electorate because campaigns primarily use early voting as an additional
opportunity for voter mobilization to ensure the party faithful actually cast ballots, not sway undecided voters.
Second, while one can make a normative argument that even strong partisans should have a moral compass and
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not vote for someone with assault charges, from an empirical perspective, research tells us that, realistically, it takes
a lot to change the minds of strong partisans. It’s unlikely that enough hardline Republicans would have changed
their vote following the Election eve assault. In fact, some analysis of election outcomes showed that while Quist did
get a boost in some Montana counties on Election Day after news of Gianforte’s assault, it was more or less
cancelled out by results in other counties where support for Gianforte increased after the incident. In fact, Election
Day voting in counties more reliably Republican or Democrat actually moved closer towards their respective
partisan tendencies on Election Day.
Given that conservative counties make up the majority of Montana counties and that a number of these have high
populations of voters, an uptick for support for Giantforte in these counties likely washed out any increase in support
for Quist. A breakdown of county-by-county election results tentatively affirms this assumption; there were more
highly populated conservative leaning counties available to push back against news of the assault by asserting their
support for Gianforte than liberal leaning counties to boost support for Quist. This is a classic example of motivated
reasoning, which suggests strong partisans, when confronted with information that runs counter to their prior beliefs
or preferences, nevertheless persist in these preferences, sometimes more strongly than before.
Finally, there is one group of early voters that may have theoretically made a difference had they waited to cast
ballots until Election Day. Independent and younger voters, though less likely to vote early, if they do, will wait until
later on in early voting periods to cast a ballot. Thus, it is plausible to argue that these voters, though they cast
ballots closer to Election Day, would nevertheless miss revelations that break as late as Gianforte’s assault. In
Montana, had these groups of voters all waited until Election Day to vote, news of the assault may have influenced
their vote choice more heavily than partisans casting ballots earlier during early voting periods.
But this would only have mattered for the election outcome if enough of those independent and younger voters had
cast their “late-in-the-game” early ballots for Gianforte to be swayed by news of the assault were they to instead vote
on Election Day. In reality these voters were more likely to vote for Quist than Gianforte in the first place. While both
candidates paid attention to early voters, Quist’s campaign placed greater emphasis on turning out independent and
young voters than Gianforte, whose efforts were more focused on mobilizing older, consistent voters. Even if there
were a number of late-in-the-game early voters who were on the fence about voting for Giantforte but ultimately cast
their absentee ballot for him, likely there were not enough of these voters to make a difference had they instead
waited to cast ballots on Election Day and decided to vote for Quist following the assault.
In sum, though it is admittedly difficult to determine with empirical certainty whether or not early voting cost Quist the
election, there is little reason to believe that there would have been enough early voters available to change their
vote preference and hand Quist a win had they waited to cast their ballots until Election Day. Because the makeup of
the early voting electorate is generally more partisan and less likely to change their vote choice with updated
information, it’s not likely enough Gianforte voters would have been willing to switch support to Quist following the
assault. And even though early voters casting ballots later in a voting period may be weaker partisans and more
susceptible to changing their minds following late breaking revelations, these groups—independents and young
voters—were more heavily courted by Quist’s campaign than Giantforte’s. The number of weak partisans voting
later in the early voting period for Gianforte was likely too small to affect the outcome had they wanted to change
their choice and vote for Quist after news of the assault broke.
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